Sunday, 15 November 2026

AAIB: A Crisis of Credibility, Transparency and Accountability in Indian Aviation Safety

 

Is India's accident investigation system delivering meaningful safety outcomes, or has institutional opacity become an acceptable substitute for accountability?

The credibility of an aircraft accident investigation authority rests on three fundamental pillars: independence, technical competence and transparency. Its effectiveness must ultimately be judged not merely by the investigations it completes or the reports it publishes, but by its contribution to preventing future accidents.

Measured against these principles, the performance of India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) raises serious concerns about its institutional effectiveness, public accountability and commitment to proactive aviation safety.

The issue is no longer confined to delays in individual investigations. It concerns the apparent absence of a consistent policy on factual disclosure, inadequate public visibility of corrective action, and the disturbing lack of demonstrable accountability for unresolved safety deficiencies.

An accident investigation agency that cannot adequately demonstrate what it has established, the safety deficiencies it has identified, and the corrective measures it has taken in response to its recommendations risks losing the credibility on which its authority depends.

International Practice: Transparency Without Compromising Investigations

International accident investigation agencies, particularly the US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), have consistently shown that investigative confidentiality and public transparency are not mutually exclusive.

Following the September 2026 Boeing 767 runway excursion at Miami, the NTSB communicated significant factual findings from the investigation, enabling the aviation community to understand the emerging sequence of events, including the unstable approach, delayed configuration, and continuation of an approach that warranted a go-around.

Similarly, following the August 2026 Vietnam Airlines Boeing 787 accident in Munich, Germany's Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) disclosed significant flight-recorder parameters, including the aircraft's acceleration, braking inputs and take-off performance.

The Learjet 60 accident in Florida in November 2026 offers another example of the NTSB's practice of communicating investigative progress and factual developments before issuing the final report.

These agencies recognise that timely factual disclosure extends beyond satisfying public curiosity. It enables operators, regulators, manufacturers and training organisations to assess whether the emerging evidence has wider operational or technical implications.

The investigation continues. The evidence is being evaluated. Causation remains undetermined until justified. However, verified facts are not unnecessarily withheld. This is a fundamental distinction that AAIB appears reluctant to embrace.

India's Recent Accidents: Reports Published, Critical Questions Unanswered

Consider three significant investigations in India.

AI171: The Ahmedabad Boeing 787 Catastrophe

The crash of Air India flight AI171 on 12 June 2025 claimed 260 lives.

AAIB published a preliminary report in July 2025 and issued an interim statement on the first anniversary. However, it has not disclosed substantive technical findings publicly.

In July 2026, the Solicitor General told the Supreme Court that it expected to submit the draft final investigation report in a sealed cover during the first week of October. The Court scheduled further consideration for 13 October 2026.

Yet, as of 15 November, no publicly verified confirmation exists that the draft report has been submitted, nor is there sufficient clarity about the outcome of the scheduled hearing or any subsequent extension.

The absence of public confirmation does not establish that the report was not filed. Nevertheless, it raises legitimate questions about the transparency of proceedings involving one of India's most consequential aviation disasters.

Was the undertaking fulfilled? If not, why was it delayed? Has the Court been informed? Why should even the procedural status of such an important investigation remain uncertain?

These questions do not require disclosure of protected cockpit recordings or confidential investigative material. They require elementary institutional accountability.


AI2379: The Airbus A320 Hydraulic-System Incident

The Air India AI2379 incident poses an equally troubling challenge.

AAIB's preliminary report documented indications of pressure loss across all three independent hydraulic systems, accompanied by a temporary degradation of flight-control capability.

This raises serious questions about system independence, common-mode failures, instrumentation reliability, and the operational consequences of simultaneous system degradation.

Yet the underlying technical mechanism has not been publicly established.

a) Was the event caused by actual hydraulic pressure loss, an instrumentation or data-acquisition anomaly, or a common-mode disturbance affecting several systems?

b) What did the recorded data show? Did the investigation identify any implications for the wider A320 fleet? Were interim technical assessments or risk-mitigation measures considered necessary?

Not every serious incident warrants an Airworthiness Directive. The absence of an AD is not, by itself, evidence of investigative failure; nor is issuing one within AAIB's authority.

But the public should reasonably expect AAIB to explain whether it has identified an immediate safety concern and whether urgent corrective action is warranted, without disclosing premature causal conclusions.

Baramati: The Fatal Learjet Accident

The January 2026 Learjet 45XR accident at Baramati, which killed Ajit Pawar and four others, also warrants attention.

a) The AAIB issued a preliminary report in February, including interim safety recommendations.

b) The critical question now is about follow-through.

c) What action has been taken on those recommendations? Which organisations are responsible? Have corrective measures been implemented? Has their effectiveness been independently verified?

Publishing recommendations is an important first step, but it does not prove the underlying safety deficiencies have been eliminated.

A safety recommendation that remains unimplemented—or whose implementation cannot be verified—provides little assurance against recurrence.

The Greater Concern: Who Ensures Safety Recommendations Are Implemented?

The more fundamental weakness may lie not in individual investigations but in the management of their safety outcomes. Figures cited for AAIB's historical investigation portfolio refer to 129 investigation reports, 606 safety recommendations, and 256 recommendations addressed to the DGCA. These figures require reconciliation with an authoritative, dated record, but they raise an important question that cannot be avoided.

Where is the comprehensive public record detailing what became of these recommendations?

AAIB states that it maintains an internal database and monitors corrective actions. However, an internal administrative record is not an adequate substitute for an accessible, auditable account of safety performance.

For every significant safety recommendation, the aviation community should be able to establish:

a. The safety deficiency identified and the organisation responsible for corrective action.

b. Whether the recommendation was accepted, rejected or modified, with the rationale documented.

c. The corrective measures implemented and their completion dates.

d. Whether implementation and effectiveness have been independently verified.

e. Which recommendations remain unresolved, overdue or inadequately addressed.

The DGCA and other recipients are responsible for responding to recommendations and implementing appropriate corrective action. AAIB must provide traceability and transparent reporting on the responses and their disposition.

Without these arrangements, accident investigation risks becoming a report-generation exercise rather than a functioning component of the national aviation safety system. A recurring deficiency identified in successive investigations is particularly serious, as it suggests that lessons may have been recorded without being effectively institutionalised.

An effective safety system must close the loop between identifying a hazard, implementing mitigation, and verifying that the residual risk has been reduced to an acceptable level.

An investigation is not a safety success merely because its report is complete. Its real value lies in preventing the next accident.

Independence: Can AAIB Investigate Government Institutions Without Constraints?

A structural issue that warrants examination.

AAIB operates within the administrative framework of the Ministry of Civil Aviation. Although the separation of accident investigation from regulatory functions is recognised, questions remain about its practical institutional independence.

Major accidents may expose deficiencies in the DGCA, airport operators, air navigation service providers, government-owned organisations, or the Ministry's own oversight arrangements.

An investigation authority must be free to investigate all such institutions without interference, institutional pressure, or concern about political or bureaucratic consequences.

Independence cannot exist merely as a rule. It must be evident in the organisation's governance, operational decisions, access to resources and freedom to publish verified findings. 

1. Who determines AAIB's public communications policy?

2. Can investigators authorise factual briefings independently?

3. Does the Ministry exert any influence over the timing, content or release of investigative information?

4. Are AAIB's performance indicators, staffing standards, technical capability and investigation delays subject to independent scrutiny?

These are questions about governance, not assertions of interference.

However, persistent opacity makes it increasingly difficult to distinguish genuine investigative confidentiality from institutional reluctance to disclose uncomfortable information.

Why the Reluctance to Communicate?

Perhaps the most disconcerting aspect of AAIB's conduct is the apparent lack of a sustained, proactive public communication strategy.

For major accidents, factual briefings should be standard in the investigation process.

They need not disclose sensitive cockpit conversations, protected witness information or speculative interpretations.

They can, however, explain what evidence has been recovered, which technical examinations have been completed and which remain outstanding, whether emerging concerns require immediate intervention, and why particular stages of the investigation are taking longer than anticipated.

The ICAO Annex 13 framework permits interim safety action and requires appropriate reporting while protecting specified sensitive records. It does not prescribe institutional silence as an investigative method.

Investigations frequently involve complex technical analysis, international consultations, laboratory examinations and competing hypotheses. Delays may therefore be entirely justified.

Unjustified, however, is treating the passage of time as a substitute for explaining investigative progress.

A prolonged information vacuum fuels speculation. Selective disclosures and unofficial narratives flourish precisely when the responsible authority fails to provide a credible factual account.

This ultimately undermines confidence not only in the investigation but also in the authority's independence and competence.

Institutional Accountability Must Be Measurable

It is time to assess AAIB against clear, independently verifiable performance standards.

a) These should include the timeliness and quality of preliminary reports, the frequency of meaningful investigation updates, the time taken to complete investigations, the management of overdue cases, the implementation status of safety recommendations, and the demonstrated effectiveness of corrective action.

b) Where investigations extend beyond the prescribed reporting period, the agency should explain the reasons through substantive interim updates rather than procedural statements that lack useful information.

c) The agency should also publish an annual accountability report setting out its investigative workload, outstanding cases, recurring safety themes, technical-capability developments, and the status of recommendations.

d) These are not extraordinary demands. They are basic expectations of a modern public safety institution.

e) Most importantly, any mechanism for independent oversight of AAIB's organisational performance must not interfere with the technical independence of individual investigations.

Investigative independence and institutional accountability are complementary obligations—not competing interests.

Does India Need AAIB? Certainly. But Does It Need AAIB in Its Present Form?

The question is not whether India requires a dedicated accident investigation authority. That need is indisputable.

The real question is whether the existing institutional structure delivers the transparency, technical competence, independence and measurable safety outcomes that justify its mandate and expenditure.

An agency cannot expect unquestioning public confidence merely because it has statutory authority.

That confidence must be earned through professional competence, timely factual communication, impartial investigations and demonstrable improvements in safety.

The victims' families deserve credible answers. Operators and flight crews deserve actionable safety intelligence. Regulators and manufacturers need timely evidence of emerging hazards. Taxpayers deserve assurance that expenditure on investigative capability delivers meaningful results.

Above all, the travelling public deserves an accident investigation system demonstrably committed to preventing recurrence.

AAIB must answer some difficult questions.

a) Who controls the release of investigative information?

b) Why are meaningful factual briefings so rare?

c) Why is there insufficient public visibility into the implementation and effectiveness of safety recommendations?

d) Why has the status of the AI171 draft report promised to the Supreme Court remained unclear to the public?

e) Who independently evaluates AAIB's performance, capability and accountability?

And, perhaps most importantly:

a. If an accident investigation does not lead to demonstrable corrective action, what assurance do we have that its lessons will prevent the next catastrophe?

b. India does not need an accident investigation authority that is merely administratively compliant. It needs one that is professionally independent, technically authoritative, operationally effective and publicly accountable.

c. An accident investigation is not complete in the broader safety-management sense when a report is published. Its purpose is fulfilled when the lessons learned are translated into effective preventive action.

Silence is not evidence of investigative rigour. Secrecy is not a substitute for independence. And publishing recommendations without demonstrable safety outcomes is not a measure of success.

The credibility of AAIB—and the integrity of India's aviation safety architecture—depend on recognising these distinctions and acting decisively on them.

Author: G R Mohan


Tuesday, 10 November 2026

Learjet 60 Crash: A Catastrophic Loss of Control — What Does the Evidence Tell Us?

 The catastrophic Learjet 60 crash near Greenacres, Florida, which claimed nine lives, raises disturbing questions about weather avoidance, high-altitude aircraft handling, structural integrity and cockpit decision-making.

While the NTSB investigation is ongoing and no probable cause has yet been established, the emerging evidence warrants careful professional scrutiny.

The critical sequence

The Learjet 60, operating a Part 135 charter flight from Austin, Texas, to North Eleuthera in the Bahamas, was cruising at FL350 when the crew encountered significant convective weather.

According to information released by investigators and recorded ATC communications:

1. The crew reported moderate turbulence, light clear ice, and altitude excursions of approximately 700 feet.

2. The reported outside air temperature was −47°C.

3. The crew requested a climb to FL370 while encountering precipitation.

4. Less than 30 seconds after receiving clearance, the aircraft entered an uncontrolled descent.

5. The crew reported an overspeed condition and extremely high descent rates.

6. Flight-tracking data indicate descent rates exceeding 30,000 feet per minute.

Perhaps the most significant physical evidence is the recovery of three pieces of the left elevator, located between 1.3 and 3.8 miles from the impact site.

The elevator separated before ground impact. What remains unknown is whether this separation initiated the loss of control or resulted from the extreme aerodynamic loads encountered during the descent. That distinction is fundamental to the investigation.

Five critical areas requiring examination


1. Convective weather avoidance

Significant convection, turbulence and precipitation raise questions about weather assessment, tactical avoidance decisions and the adequacy of lateral separation. A fundamental principle of high-altitude jet operations is that attempting to climb above developing convection may introduce additional risks, particularly when the aircraft is already experiencing severe atmospheric disturbances.
Did the crew adequately recognise the developing threat, and were safer avoidance options available?
A further concern is the inherent limitation of airborne weather radar in detecting high-altitude ice-crystal concentrations. Conventional radar relies primarily on precipitation reflectivity, which decreases markedly when liquid water is replaced by dry ice particles. As a result, an aircraft could encounter hazardous concentrations of ice crystals within or near a convective system without producing strong radar returns. If the radar antenna was not tilted to examine the more reflective precipitation regions below, the crew may have significantly underestimated the extent and intensity of the convective activity.
This raises two important investigative questions:

a. Did the weather radar provide an incomplete or misleading picture of the convective environment?

b. Could an encounter with high-altitude ice crystals have contributed to an air-data anomaly or unreliable airspeed indications?

Both possibilities warrant examination through meteorological reconstruction, radar operating parameters, crew observations and flight-recorder data.


2. High-altitude aerodynamic margins

At FL350, the Learjet operated in an environment where the margins between low-speed buffet and high-speed limitations could be relatively narrow, depending on weight, Mach number, and atmospheric conditions.
Turbulence, abrupt vertical air movements and inappropriate control inputs can rapidly erode those margins.
The relationship between the requested climb, the onset of the rapid descent and the subsequent overspeed warrants detailed examination.

3. Icing and airspeed reliability

The reported clear icing at −47°C is meteorologically unusual and warrants investigation. Supercooled liquid water is unlikely to persist below about -40°C, so “clear ice” at -47°C is inconsistent with classic airframe icing. One possibility is high-altitude ice-crystal icing near deep convection, which is known to affect pitot probes and engines more than airframes. Another is that the crew misidentified what they saw, or that strong updrafts carried liquid water higher than usual. Ice crystals causing unreliable airspeed is a credible hypothesis, but it remains unconfirmed.


4. Structural failure: Cause or consequence?

The in-flight separation of the left elevator is a major finding in the investigation.
Was there a pre-existing structural weakness, aerodynamic flutter or overload? Alternatively, did the elevator separate after the aircraft entered a high-speed, high-load descent?
Fracture characteristics, aircraft maintenance history and the recorded flight sequence will be essential to establishing the chronology.
Until investigators examine that evidence, attributing the accident to structural failure would be premature.

5. Human factors and operational oversight

The investigation must also examine crew coordination, weather-related decision-making, workload management, and the operator’s procedures for avoiding convective weather.
Crew experience and regulatory qualifications alone cannot establish how effective cockpit coordination was.
Equally important are the company’s training standards, operational risk assessment, flight-following arrangements, and safety management processes.

The Flight Level Change

The Learjet was apparently cruising normally at FL410 before descending 6,000 feet into an environment where the crew subsequently encountered significant turbulence, precipitation and reported icing. Available ATC information suggests ATC initiated the descent from FL410 to FL350 rather than the Learjet crew requesting it. The reason for that instruction has not yet been established. This distinction is important in reconstructing the accident sequence.

This raises several important investigative questions:

a. What prompted the FL350 descent clearance?

b. Did the crew request to remain at FL410 or question the descent?

c. What weather information was available to ATC and the crew at the time?

d. Was FL350 within the convective cloud system while FL410 offered a more favourable environment?

e. Did the descent expose the aircraft to conditions that could have been avoided by remaining at FL410 or deviating laterally?

The central question is whether the descent from FL410 to FL350 materially increased the aircraft's exposure to hazardous weather.

An important development

On 9 November, the NTSB confirmed it recovered the cockpit voice recorder, which it is evaluating at its Washington laboratory.
If usable, the CVR could provide critical insight into the crew’s assessment of the weather, aircraft behaviour, cockpit communication and the final loss-of-control sequence.


The larger safety question

This accident involves a potentially complex interplay of environmental hazards, aerodynamic limitations, aircraft structural integrity and human decision-making.

The investigation must establish not only what failed, but also the sequence in which the safety barriers were challenged, degraded or breached.

Was the initial event a weather-induced loss of control, an air-data anomaly, a structural failure, or a combination of factors?

The available evidence does not yet permit a definitive answer.

The essential lesson is that accident prevention depends on recognising and managing escalating threats before the aircraft reaches a condition from which recovery may no longer be possible.

For now, speculation must remain subordinate to evidence. The NTSB’s ongoing investigation should provide the factual basis for identifying the operation


Author: GR Mohan

Thursday, 29 October 2026

“It Was Only a Joke”: Why Words Carry Weight in the Cabin

 What United Flight 1681's return to Las Vegas should teach every passenger who boards with a phone in hand

Every pilot has heard the line: a passenger says something stupid at the gate or on board, the crew reacts, and the explanation comes later—it was only a joke. On Saturday night, 24 October 2026, that explanation was tested again over the Nevada desert, leaving 150 passengers to spend the night in Las Vegas.

What happened

United Airlines Flight 1681, a Boeing 737 carrying 150 passengers and six crew members, departed Las Vegas’ Harry Reid International Airport on a scheduled red-eye flight to Newark. Shortly after take-off, a flight attendant noticed a passenger’s phone screen. According to the arrest report, the passenger, 25-year-old Dante Milne of New Jersey, allegedly texted that he planned to hijack the aircraft and “crash ur row only.” The original message included an expletive.

The flight attendant alerted the captain. About 13 minutes after take-off, the crew set the transponder to an emergency code, secured the flight deck, and turned back. The aircraft landed at about 11:05 p.m., roughly 30 minutes after the emergency began. Las Vegas police met the aircraft at the gate and took the passenger into custody.

He faces one count of making threats or conveying false information about an act of terrorism, an offence punishable by one to 20 years in prison. He was released on US$10,000 bail. At his court appearance on Tuesday, 27 October, his attorney told the judge that he intends to plead not guilty. His next court date is 5 January 2027. Separately, the FAA has confirmed that it is investigating.

The crew got it right

Having spent much of my career in the left seat and as an examiner, I want to give credit where it’s due: this was a textbook example.

The crew did not confront the passenger. Radio reports indicate that the captain told controllers the passenger had no idea what was happening, the crew had gone into lockdown, and no restraint was needed because the passenger was compliant and unaware. That is exactly what you want: isolate a potential threat without alerting it, secure the flight deck, and land at a station where law enforcement is waiting.

The crew also made an airmanship decision most passengers will never appreciate. Shortly after take-off on a transcontinental flight, the 737 was well above its maximum landing weight. The crew told ATC they were overweight and chose to land anyway, using the full runway rather than holding to burn fuel. An overweight landing is a planned, trained procedure that requires a post-landing maintenance inspection. No captain would choose to circle over Las Vegas with an unresolved security threat in the cabin. The crew weighed the risks and made the right call.

“Banter between coworkers”

According to the arrest report, the passenger told investigators he had a beer and several shots at an airport bar before boarding. He then fell asleep and woke to find the aircraft returning to Las Vegas. He said he initially could not recall the messages. Asked specifically about the hijack text, he described it as poorly worded banter between colleagues. He said he never intended to take control of the aircraft and apologised.

He may have meant no harm. But every traveller needs to understand this: the crew has no way of knowing. A flight attendant who sees the words “hijack” and “crash” on a phone screen aboard a climbing aircraft cannot question the sender, check their background, or ask the recipient whether it was a joke. The risk is entirely one-sided. If the crew treats a joke as real, the cost is a diversion and a lost night. If they dismiss a real threat as a joke, the cost is unthinkable. Since 2001, the entire security system has been built on one principle: respond to the words, not the private intent of the person who said them.

The real cost of a few words

United reported that the flight was delayed overnight after the crew reached its permitted duty time, then departed for Newark the next morning. That detail matters: the security response did more than require an extra landing; it used up the crew’s legal duty day. The crew needed a fresh crew and an overnight stay, affecting aircraft rotation and connecting passengers. The crew interviewed all passengers, and baggage was offloaded and rigorously re-screened.


Consider who paid for that message. 150 passengers lost a night, missing onward connections and commitments. Six crew members had their schedules disrupted. The airline covered the costs of the diversion, the overweight landing inspection, hotel and meal provisions, re-crewing, and passenger rebooking. Police and airport resources were also deployed. The individual now faces a criminal case, legal fees, and possible consequences for his job, travel, and reputation.

The penalties can be serious. The FAA may propose civil penalties for each violation, and a single incident can lead to several. The FAA may refer cases to the FBI, which could lead to a felony conviction. Unruly behaviour can also affect a traveller’s eligibility for TSA Precheck and prompt an airline to place the passenger on its internal no-fly list. These consequences are in addition to any criminal charges brought by state or federal prosecutors.

Is bad behaviour on the rise?

It’s tempting to say things are getting worse, but the data tells a more nuanced story. The FAA recorded a peak of 5,973 unruly passenger reports in 2021. The figure fell to 2,096 in 2024 and 1,621 in 2025. Through August 2026, there were 1,163 reports, slightly ahead of last year’s pace. The FAA told the Associated Press that the 2026 count had topped 1,400. Globally, IATA data shows the rate improving from one incident per 307 flights in 2024 to one per 355 in 2025.

The honest picture isn’t a runaway trend. It’s a stubborn baseline that hasn’t gone away, with alcohol repeatedly appearing as an accelerant, as it allegedly did here. Threat “jokes” are a distinct and much more serious category than general unruliness: when the words imply danger to the aircraft, the response shifts from cabin management to a security emergency.

What has changed is the medium. Ten years ago, someone had to overhear a careless remark. Today, it appears on a glowing screen, visible to anyone in the next seat or along the aisle—and, in some cases, flagged by people beyond the aircraft.

A cautionary tale from Europe

In July 2022, an 18-year-old British student sent a Snapchat message joking about blowing up a plane to a private group of friends before boarding an easyJet flight from London Gatwick to Menorca. UK security services flagged the message, prompting the Spanish Air Force to scramble F-18 fighters to escort the aircraft. A search found nothing. Police arrested the young man upon arrival, and he spent time in a police cell.

In January 2024, a Spanish court acquitted him, ruling that the message was sent in a strictly private setting and that he could not have expected it to be intercepted. Even so, he had already endured arrest, custody, and roughly 18 months of legal proceedings. Prosecutors had sought a €22,500 fine, plus €94,800 in damages to the Spanish Ministry of Defence to cover the cost of deploying the fighter.

The lesson is clear: even if a court ultimately accepts that it was a joke, the process itself is the punishment.

The bottom line

Airports and aircraft aren’t ordinary public spaces. They’re security-sensitive environments where certain words trigger an immediate response, and the people responding are trained to take no chances. Words such as hijack, bomb, crash, gun or explosive—and any phrase suggesting harm to an aircraft, its passengers or its facilities—will be taken at face value, whether spoken aloud, typed on a screen or posted online.

My advice to the travelling public is simple: leave the dark humour at home. Don’t joke about it at security, in the cabin or in your group chat, and don’t drink so much that you can’t keep your thumbs in check. The crew’s job is to protect everyone on board, and that’s exactly what they’ll do. The consequences are real: arrest, prosecution, and imprisonment; high legal and financial costs; job loss; reputational damage; being barred from flying; and the disruption and expense imposed on hundreds of innocent people.

A few careless words can cost you far more than you bargained for. In aviation, there is no such thing as “just a joke.”

G R Mohan

Monday, 26 October 2026

The Much-Awaited AI 171 Report: Will We Get Answers, or Just Another Sealed Envelope?

 At the July 28 hearing, Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the government, assured the Supreme Court that the AAIB would complete its work by mid-September, with a buffer extending through the end of October 2026. The AAIB’s affidavit confirmed that it expected to submit the draft final report by October. The court accepted this timeline and deferred any decision on an independent investigation or a Court of Inquiry until it received the report. We are now at the end of that buffer. 

The phrase to watch is “draft final report.” Under ICAO Annex 13, the investigating State circulates a draft to accredited representatives, including the NTSB, BEA, and AAIB-UK, for comment before finalising the report. The AAIB has said the October target reflects the time needed for technical analysis and international consultation before the public release. Whatever lands on the bench may be substantive, but it is not the final word. The final report may still be months away.

The court has also deliberately held back. It deferred the petitions seeking a Court of Inquiry without dismissing them, saying it would consider them once it had assessed the AAIB’s findings for credibility and completeness. The court also directed the AAIB to consider the Federation of Indian Pilots’ technical submission regarding the timing of the RAT deployment.

The two most contentious issues are unlikely to be settled publicly any time soon. The first concerns the CVR. The AAIB has argued that there is an “absolute statutory prohibition” on releasing cockpit voice and airborne image recordings to any external committee or the public. That is correct for the raw recordings. But Annex 13 is equally clear that portions of the record pertinent to the analysis belong in the final report, and only those not essential to it remain protected. The AAIB has already exercised that latitude once. The preliminary report placed the fuel control switches moving from RUN to CUTOFF about three seconds after liftoff and quoted a single exchange in which one pilot asked the other why he had cut off, and the other denied it. That one line has fuelled more than a year of speculation. Now that it has been released, the AAIB owes the families and the profession context. Take-off is a sterile-cockpit phase, during which only matters pertinent to the flight should be discussed. A transcript extract from the take-off roll to the end of the recording would therefore contain little private information and almost nothing that isn’t pertinent. The final report should include it. Anything less leaves a narrative built on one sentence.

The backdrop has not helped. On August 4, AI 2379, an A320neo flying from Phuket to Delhi, briefly lost all three hydraulic systems at FL360. The aircraft climbed 372 ft, stalled for two seconds, then dropped 292 ft, injuring 24 people. The AAIB’s preliminary report found that the captain tested positive for a psychoactive substance and described this as a serious concern requiring priority action by the DGCA. Air India terminated him that same day. However, the report found no causal link between the test result and the hydraulic event. Investigators are still determining whether pressure was actually lost or whether the indications were erroneous. The first officer, who was flying the aircraft, tested negative.

Weeks later, on September 30, flydubai FZ1073 (Dubai–Tel Aviv) turned into a nightmare. The UAE prosecutor general said the co-pilot attacked the Indian captain, Smit Machchhar, with the crash axe and attempted to seize control of the aircraft. The prosecutor characterised the incident as an attempted terrorist act. Reports suggest Oman had previously barred the co-pilot from flying over concerns about radical views. However, the motive has not been officially established.

So here is the question I keep returning to. With pilot conduct under this kind of global scrutiny, will the AAIB be willing to state its findings on AI 171 categorically? If the evidence points to the flight deck, there will be enormous pressure to soften the language. That pressure would come from the families, the pilot community, and a court that has already called the selective early leaks irresponsible. If the evidence points to the aircraft, the pressure would run the other way, towards Boeing, GE, and the entire 787 fleet. Either way, the credibility of Indian accident investigation is on the line. An ambiguous report would satisfy no one and achieve nothing.

Hopefully, we’ll have some clarity in the next couple of weeks, if the Supreme Court decides to make the report—or at least its findings—public.


Author: G R Mohan

Sunday, 25 October 2026

Closing the Loop: Accident Investigation and Safety Recommendation Follow-Up in India

 An accident investigation is only as useful as what happens after the report is published. India has built a sound framework for investigating accidents, but follow-up on safety recommendations lacks public visibility, and that gap limits the system's ability to show that lessons are being learned.

This paper examines how India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) and the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) handle recommendations once a report is closed. It draws on AAIB's published procedures, its final reports, parliamentary committee findings, ICAO audit results and court filings. The aim is constructive: to identify where the loop between investigation and implementation can be closed, using practices already proven elsewhere.

The framework

1. On paper, India's process for closing safety recommendations aligns with the ICAO model. The addressee must reply within 90 days; AAIB must assess whether the reply is adequate and track progress.

2. AAIB is a relatively young institution. Before 2012, DGCA or a Court of Inquiry investigated major accidents; for example, the 2010 Mangalore accident was investigated by a Court of Inquiry because AAIB did not yet exist (Deccan Herald). AAIB functions as an attached office of the Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA), which also oversees DGCA (ICAO COSCAP presentation).

3. The legal basis was updated in November 2025. The Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules, 2025, framed under the Bharatiya Vayuyan Adhiniyam, 2024, replaced the 2017 Rules framed under the Aircraft Act, 1934 (AMS Shardul). AAIB investigates all accidents and serious incidents involving aircraft above 2,250 kg or turbojet aircraft, while DGCA investigates serious incidents involving aircraft of 2,250 kg or less (SCC Online).

4. AAIB's published procedure for safety recommendations, which cites Rule 8(3)(h) of the 2017 Rules, works as follows:

a) AAIB forwards each recommendation to DGCA or the relevant authority.

b) The addressee informs AAIB within 90 days of the action taken or under consideration or explains why no action will be taken.

c) AAIB evaluates the response. If it is inadequate, AAIB consults the addressee and seeks justification.

d) AAIB monitors progress and maintains a database of recommendations and the action taken on each.

Open question: whether the 2025 Rules carry forward the 90-day reply and adequacy assessment unchanged, and whether they add any duty to publish.

What the published record shows

AAIB's final reports are public, but follow-up on their recommendations is not. My review of AAIB's published final reports found the following:

Measure

Count

Final reports reviewed (since [start year])

129

Safety recommendations in those reports

606

Recommendations addressed to DGCA

259

Reports noting that earlier recommendations were still not implemented

11

DGCA replies or AAIB adequacy assessments published

0


AAIB states that it maintains a database of recommendations and the actions taken on each. That record exists but has not been published.

The reports themselves show why these matters. In its final report on the March 2024 accident at Guna involving a Cessna 172S training aircraft, AAIB cited the absence of timely communication from air traffic control as a contributory factor (Deccan Chronicle). The report notes that AAIB had already recommended that DGCA mandate the recording of radio communications between aircraft and ATC, and that "the same recommendation is still pending".

In 2020, AAIB was asked, under the Right to Information Act, what action it had taken on its findings regarding DGCA in two fatal accidents. For both, the reply was: "Matter pertains to DGCA." The reply was procedurally correct, since DGCA is the implementing authority. But it illustrates the gap: once a recommendation leaves AAIB, the public record shows no indication of whether it was accepted, implemented, or closed.

Method notes counts cover only final reports. A recommendation addressed to DGCA jointly with other agencies is counted once under DGCA.

Case study: tabletop runways, 2010 to 2026

The sequence from Mangalore to Kozhikode illustrates how long it took to implement runway safety measures and why a public tracking record would help. AAIB itself noted that the events at Kozhikode mirrored the 2010 Mangalore accident (Udayavani/PTI).

Year

Event

2010

Air India Express B737-800 overruns at Mangalore; 158 fatalities. An expert panel recommends EMAS on tabletop runways (Onmanorama).

2011

A member of DGCA's Civil Aviation Safety Advisory Council writes to senior officials about the adequacy of Kozhikode's runway safety provisions in wet conditions (Gulf News/Bloomberg).

2011, 2017

RESA developed at Kozhikode; EMAS not installed (Onmanorama).

2020

Air India Express B737-800 overruns at Kozhikode; 18 fatalities (Onmanorama).

2021

AAIB publishes its final report with 43 safety recommendations. MoCA forms a high-level panel to examine them and to review implementation of the Mangalore recommendations (Udayavani/PTI).

2023

MoCA states that providing RESA would take about three years after land is handed to AAI (Aviation A2Z).

2024

Environmental clearance recommended for extending RESA from 90 m to 240 m at both ends (Onmanorama).

Many of the delays had genuine causes, including land acquisition, cost, and coordination between central and state governments. The point is not that agencies were inactive. Instead, sixteen years after Mangalore, no single public source shows which recommendations were completed, when, and which remain open. The 2021 review panel's task of establishing the status of the Mangalore recommendations would have been simpler with such a record.

Open question: current completion status of the 240 m RESA at Kozhikode.

Capacity, timeliness and external oversight

Parliament has repeatedly flagged that both the investigator and the implementing regulator are under-resourced. Closing recommendations depend on capacity at both levels.

In 2022, the Standing Committee on Transport, Tourism and Culture noted that AAIB's 2022–23 budget of ₹1 crore fell short of its projected need of ₹4 crore, recommended bringing AAIB's methods and technology up to global standards, and observed that reports sometimes took too long to finalise (PRS India). Its March 2025 report recorded vacancies of 53.8% in DGCA, 34.7% in BCAS and 17% in AAI (Vision IAS). AAIB's own Kozhikode report recommended strengthening AAIB with full-time investigators, a permanent aviation medicine specialist and a flight recorder laboratory (The News Minute/PTI).

The ICAO audit result is often cited as evidence of a strong system. India's overall Effective Implementation score rose to 85.65% in November 2022, up from 69.95% in 2018 (Vajiram & Ravi). However, the 2022 mission did not audit accident investigation (AIG) or air navigation services; the overall score used earlier results for those two areas (The Pioneer). Therefore, the AIG assessment predates 2022.

The AI171 investigation has brought these questions before the Supreme Court. Petitions seeking a court-monitored inquiry were filed in 2025, and AAIB has opposed a parallel investigation, arguing that Annex 13 and Indian law provide a complete framework (Deccan Herald). The court chose to await AAIB's report, which the government said it would file in a sealed cover in early October 2026 (Business Today). The investigation is complex, and international practice allows final reports to take longer than a year, provided it issues interim statements.

Open question: outcome of the 13 October 2026 hearing.

Transparency of investigation material

Protecting cockpit voice recordings is essential, but a well-established middle ground exists between releasing audio and releasing nothing.

AAIB has told the Supreme Court that Rule 17(5) of the 2025 Rules prohibits public disclosure of CVR audio and airborne image recordings (Outlook). This protection is sound. Pilots accept cockpit recording because authorities use the audio only for safety investigations, and very few authorities release it.

Transcripts are treated differently. Under Rule 17, the Central Government may disclose protected records, including CVR transcripts, if it determines disclosure is necessary, despite its impact on investigations (Asianet Newsable). ICAO Annex 13 also permits the parts of a CVR record pertinent to the analysis to be included in the final report. Peer investigation authorities routinely publish relevant transcript excerpts in their final reports, while withholding personal or irrelevant conversation.

Two refinements would strengthen confidence without compromising protection. First, final reports could include timestamped transcript excerpts relevant to the analysis, as peer authorities do. Second, an independent body outside the ministry that oversees the regulator, such as a judicial authority, could make the disclosure-balancing decision, as several states have arranged.

How other investigation bodies close the loop

Several established investigation authorities make recommendations for follow-up public, and their models could be adopted without new legislation.

Authority

Public follow-up practice

NTSB (United States)

Publishes each recommendation, the recipient's response and a status classification, searchable online

AAIB (United Kingdom)

Publishes recommendation responses and its assessment of them; sits within the Department for Transport yet is widely regarded as independent in practice

European Union (Regulation 996/2010)

90-day reply requirement similar to India's; recommendations and responses recorded in a central EU database

ATSB (Australia)

Publishes responses and the current status of each recommendation


The UK example is instructive. Administrative location within a ministry does not, by itself, determine credibility. Publishing responses and a consistent practice of candour carry most of the weight.

Open question: confirm the current details of each practice against the authorities' own websites before citing.

Recommendations

Five measures would make follow-up visible, ordered from simplest to most involved. The first three require no changes to the law.

1. Publish the existing database. For each recommendation, display the addressee, the reply, AAIB's adequacy assessment, and the current status, as AAIB already records them.

2. Report annually to Parliament on open recommendations, including how long each has been open, to ensure long-pending items receive attention.

3. Include relevant CVR transcript excerpts in final reports, as permitted by Annex 13 and practised by peer authorities, while continuing to protect audio and personal conversation.

4. Place the disclosure-balancing decision under Rule 17 with an authority independent of the regulator's parent ministry, such as a judicial authority.

5. Strengthen AAIB's structural independence and capacity, including a direct reporting line outside the ministry that oversees DGCA, full staffing, and responsibility for investigating serious incidents involving light aircraft.

Conclusion

India's investigators produce detailed reports and make substantial recommendations. What is missing is the final step: a public record showing that each recommendation has been addressed, assessed and closed.

The information already exists within AAIB. Publishing it would cost little, credit agencies that have acted, and let the public, Parliament, and the industry see where work remains. It would also strengthen confidence in AAIB at a time when its largest investigation is under scrutiny. Every investigation aims to ensure the same accident does not happen twice. A transparent closure record shows that a system has learned.


Author: G R Mohan

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