Miami Runway Excursion: A Failure of Barriers Before the Runway End

 The 21 Air Boeing 767 accident in Miami on 6 September 2026 is disturbing not merely because an aircraft overran a runway with fatal consequences. It is disturbing because preliminary evidence suggests that several established safety barriers may have been progressively breached before the aircraft even left the paved surface.

The NTSB investigation remains ongoing, and it has not yet determined a probable cause. Yet within three days of the accident, the Board released verified information from the Cockpit Voice Recorder and Flight Data Recorder. That preliminary sequence already raises serious questions about stabilised-approach discipline, Crew Resource Management, cockpit authority gradient, training and organisational safety culture.

The emerging picture is stark.

Configuration for landing was delayed. Flaps 5 was called less than three minutes before the end of the CVR recording, followed by landing gear, Flaps 15 and Flaps 20. When Flaps 20 was called, the other pilot cautioned that the aircraft was too fast. The NTSB states that this pilot made further comments about excessive speed throughout the remainder of the recording, and the pilot flying did not consistently respond.

The autopilot was subsequently disengaged. The automated 1,000-foot call was followed by a “sink rate” warning. Another “sink rate” warning occurred below 500 feet. Around minimums, repeated “too low terrain” alerts were issued. Flaps 30 were not called until approximately 41 seconds before the recording ended, immediately before the final radio-altitude callouts and touchdown.

This is precisely the type of sequence that the stabilised-approach criteria are designed to prevent.

A stabilised approach is not an aspirational description of a good approach. It is a procedural safety barrier against continuation bias, deteriorating energy states, and last-minute improvisation.

At the designated stabilisation gate, the aircraft should be on the correct flightpath, properly configured, within prescribed speed and descent-rate limits, and the crew should be ready to land. If those criteria are not met, the required response should be unequivocal:

GO AROUND.

The precise company criteria applicable to this flight must be established by the investigation. However, irrespective of the individual numerical limits, the sequence raises a fundamental question:

Why did accumulating deviations and repeated warnings not produce decisive intervention?

CRM is intervention—not commentary

That question extends well beyond the pilot flying.

a) The pilot monitoring is not a spectator.

b) There is an important difference between:

“Too fast.”

and

“UNSTABLE—GO AROUND.”

The first describes a condition.

The second triggers a safety defence. Effective CRM requires monitoring, challenging, responding and, where necessary, escalation. If the aircraft continues through a mandatory stability gate outside limits, repeatedly describing the deviation cannot, by itself, constitute an effective defence.

The investigation therefore needs to establish whether stabilised-approach calls were clearly defined, whether a go-around became mandatory once specified criteria were exceeded, and whether the pilot monitoring was explicitly authorised to insist on it.

But another important human-factors question should also be examined:

Was there a cockpit authority gradient?

A steep cockpit gradient can significantly reduce the monitoring pilot's effectiveness.

If one pilot is substantially more senior, more experienced, holds a training or checking position, or otherwise has greater organisational authority, the other pilot may be reluctant to challenge decisions forcefully. The PM may recognise that an approach is deteriorating and may even repeatedly verbalise concern, yet stop short of the decisive intervention that CRM requires.

Nothing currently released by the NTSB establishes that such a gradient existed on Flight 7598. It would therefore be incorrect to assert that it did.

But the recorder’s summary makes the question legitimate.

One pilot repeatedly expressed concern about excessive speed. The approach nevertheless continued, and the NTSB specifically notes the lack of a consistent verbal response.

Investigators should therefore examine the pilots' respective qualifications, seniority, flying experience, company roles, and previous professional relationship.

a) Was the PM hesitant to challenge the PF?

b) Was an excessive authority gradient present?

c) Was there deference arising from rank, experience or training status?

d) Did the airline's CRM programme specifically teach pilots how to handle such gradients?

e) Most importantly, were pilots trained that once a defined safety limit had been crossed, procedural authority superseded cockpit hierarchy?

In a mature CRM environment, rank should become irrelevant if a mandatory safety criterion is violated.

The correct call from the more junior pilot must carry exactly the same operational weight as one from the captain.

From an approach problem to a runway emergency

The touchdown sequence shows how quickly options disappeared.

The FDR recorded the nose and right main gear touching down at 158 knots. Braking began around 146 knots, and the left main gear did not register touchdown until approximately 134 knots. These values cannot be conclusively interpreted without weight, VREF, wind, touchdown position and runway conditions, but the sequence clearly warrants detailed examination.

What happened next is particularly significant.

At approximately 120 knots, the brakes were released, and the thrust was increased to a value consistent with go-around thrust. The CVR also recorded a go-around call.

Four seconds later, the throttles were returned to idle, and the brakes were reapplied at approximately 117 knots. The aircraft subsequently departed the paved surface. The FDR also showed no indication that either speed brakes or thrust reversers had been deployed before recording ended.

The investigation must establish why the go-around was initiated after touchdown and then abandoned, and why the principal additional deceleration systems were apparently not deployed.

But operationally, the broader lesson is clear.

A relatively straightforward decision available hundreds of feet earlier had become far more difficult:

Continue stopping—or attempt to fly again?

That is exactly the predicament that stabilised-approach gates are intended to prevent.

The investigation must move beyond the cockpit

Nevertheless, it would be inadequate to treat Miami as simply an error by two pilots.

The more important investigation may lie upstream.

What was the operational culture at 21 Air?

How rigorously were the stabilised-approach and mandatory go-around policies enforced?

Were pilots genuinely encouraged to go around without concern for schedule disruption, additional fuel consumption or criticism?

Did recurrent simulator training realistically expose crews to continuation bias, high-energy approaches, late configuration, rejected landings and assertive PM intervention?

Did CRM scenarios deliberately place junior pilots opposite dominant or highly experienced captains and require them to escalate from advisory language to a mandatory go-around call?

That last point matters greatly.

CRM training is incomplete if crews practise cooperation only when both pilots agree. Its true test is whether the less authoritative cockpit member can intervene effectively when the more authoritative one persists with an unsafe course of action.

The investigation should also examine line checks, recurrent simulator reports, Flight Data Monitoring, and internal safety reports.

a) Were there any previous high-energy or unstable approaches?

b) Was late configuration occurring during the operation?

c) Were crews continuing below stabilisation gates?

d) Had FDM identified such trends?

e) If so, what corrective action was taken?

A mature Safety Management System should identify these precursors before they culminate in an accident.

Safety culture is therefore not demonstrated merely by having a stabilised-approach policy in the operations manual.

It is demonstrated when a junior first officer believes, without hesitation, that calling “GO AROUND” to a senior captain will be supported by the organisation.

Transparency is another safety barrier

Miami also offers a second important lesson.

The NTSB did not wait for the final report before communicating established facts. It held public briefings and released preliminary recorder data, while clearly stating that the data were preliminary and subject to change. The investigation remains ongoing.

That distinction is crucial.

Transparency is not premature judgement.

Verified facts can be disclosed without assigning blame or stating probable cause.

The contrast with recent Indian investigations inevitably raises questions about whether more frequent disclosure of established safety-relevant facts could reduce the information vacuum between formal reports.

Information vacuums do not eliminate speculation. They often fuel it.

Responsible disclosure strengthens confidence, allows operators to review their own procedures, and enables safety lessons to circulate before a final report is completed.

The wider lesson

The central question arising from Miami may ultimately not be simply:

Why did the pilot flying continue?

It may be:

Why did the system surrounding that pilot fail to stop the continuation?

That encompasses the PF, the PM, possible cockpit gradient, SOPs, recurrent training, checking, FDM, SMS and management culture.

What is concerning is a mechanism by which a PM can recognise the hazard and repeatedly voice concern yet still fail to escalate to an effective intervention.

Accidents rarely result from a single defence failing. They occur when successive barriers fail, are bypassed, or become ineffective.

Miami offers an opportunity to examine precisely such a progression.

The NTSB is also demonstrating another principle equally important to aviation safety:

An investigation can be rigorous without being silent and transparent without being premature.

Author: GR Mohan

Potomac Mid-Air Collision: A Failure to Convert Warning Signs into Safety Action

 The most important lesson from the January 2025 mid-air collision near Washington National Airport is not that a single crew or controller made an isolated mistake. Rather, multiple agencies had warning signs of an emerging collision risk, yet the system failed to translate those warnings into effective preventive action.

The NTSB investigation found that the hazard was neither unknown nor unforeseeable. The airspace around DCA had a documented history of close encounters between helicopters and commercial aircraft. Pilots and controllers had raised concerns. Safety databases recorded relevant events. Local working groups had discussed the geometry of Helicopter Route 4 and its proximity to the Runway 33 approach.

Over the three years preceding the accident, FAA/ASIAS analysis identified 15,214 encounters between commercial aeroplanes and helicopters in which lateral separation was less than 1 nautical mile and vertical separation was less than 400 ft. This averages roughly 390 proximity events per month. On the northern segment of Route 4—the accident area—analysis of the preceding 12 months showed that 49% of helicopter flights exceeded the published route altitude at least once, and 17% of all recorded track points on that segment were above the altitude limit.

Yet meaningful mitigation did not occur before the fatal accident. This was fundamentally a failure of the Safety Management System across organisational boundaries.

A Known Hazard

Helicopter Route 4 passed close beneath the Runway 33 approach path. Under certain conditions, the theoretical vertical separation between a helicopter operating at the published route altitude and an arriving airliner could be as little as 75 ft.

Such a margin depended heavily on precise altitude compliance, correct altimeter indications, controller situational awareness, successful visual acquisition, and timely intervention.

This was therefore not a robustly separated traffic system. It relied on several safety barriers functioning correctly every time.

Repeated close-proximity events should have prompted progressively stronger risk assessment. Instead, individual occurrences appear to have been treated largely as separate incidents rather than as evidence of a recurring systemic hazard.

Data Existed, but Risk Was Not Integrated

The FAA, controllers, airline crews and military helicopter operators each possessed parts of the safety picture.

Pilot and controller reporting systems recorded reports. Surveillance and proximity data were available. TCAS events had occurred. Operational concerns had been raised locally.

But an SMS is not effective merely because data are collected. Its purpose is to connect the sequence:

hazard identification → risk assessment → mitigation → safety assurance.

At DCA, that loop was not closed effectively.

The problem was fragmentation. FAA route planners saw one aspect of the risk. Controllers saw another. Airlines and their crews experienced yet another. The Army held its own operational and training information. No single organisation appears to have assembled these inputs into a shared conclusion that the collision risk had become unacceptable.

That is a major systemic failure.

FAA and ATC Failures

The FAA bears significant responsibility because it controlled both the airspace design and the wider safety framework.

The NTSB found that helicopter routes were not reviewed and reassessed with sufficient rigour, despite accumulating safety information and prior recommendations. The Route 4 geometry should have prompted reconsideration well before the accident.

At tower level, high workload and combined controller positions further reduced resilience. The controller had to manage helicopter and fixed-wing traffic in a complex night-time environment. This affected situational awareness, traffic advisories and the ability to recognise the developing conflict.

The deeper issue is not simply a controller error. It is whether ATC management had allowed a demanding operating configuration to become routine without a sufficiently robust real-time risk-assessment process.

When controllers are repeatedly required to “make the system work” under high workload and tight margins, that is itself a safety warning.

Overreliance on Visual Separation

The system also relied heavily on pilot-applied visual separation.

That is particularly vulnerable at night, when distance, closure rate and aircraft identity are harder to judge. Night-vision goggles restrict the field of view and can complicate visual acquisition.

In such circumstances, “traffic in sight” should not serve as the primary defence against inadequate route separation.

Visual separation should supplement safe airspace design, not compensate for poor geometry.

Army Safety-Management Failures

The Army also had significant responsibilities.

Helicopter altitude compliance was critical because even small deviations could materially reduce the already limited vertical separation.

The investigation identified shortcomings in understanding altimeter tolerances and in the Army’s broader safety-management processes. A stronger SMS, supported by flight-data monitoring and systematic analysis of altitude exceedances, should have determined whether Route 4 operations were routinely eroding the intended safety margin.

Without that feedback mechanism, potentially important trends were not translated into operational change.

Technology Was an Incomplete Defence

Collision-avoidance technology could not be relied on as a final safeguard.

TCAS protection is limited close to the ground, and helicopter surveillance and ADS-B capabilities were not always equivalent to those of commercial aircraft.

This reinforces a basic principle: collision-avoidance systems should be the last line of defence, not the primary solution to poor traffic geometry.

The system should have prevented the aircraft from coming so close in the first place.

A Failure Across Agencies

The strongest conclusion is that responsibility was shared.

The FAA was responsible for airspace design, route review and ATC safety oversight.

a) ATC management was responsible for staffing, workload, position combining and operational risk controls.

b) The Army was responsible for helicopter operations, altitude discipline, training and its own SMS.

c) Airline and controller reports provided further warning data.

d) Yet the overall system failed to integrate these inputs into a unified risk picture.

This is precisely where inter-agency safety management becomes critical. When several organisations share the same airspace, no agency can assess safety solely within its own organisational boundaries. The risk belongs to the system as a whole.

The NTSB’s Recommendations

The NTSB consequently recommended wide-ranging measures, including:

1) redesign and regular review of helicopter routes;

2) stronger vertical and lateral separation criteria;

3) improved analysis and sharing of close-proximity data;

4) better ATC workload and position-combining controls;

5) improved real-time operational risk assessment;

6) stronger controller training in visual separation and threat management;

7) improvements to conflict-alert systems and frequency management;

8) broader ADS-B In and collision-avoidance capability; and

9) stronger Army SMS, flight-data monitoring and altitude-awareness training.

These recommendations are important because they address the system that allowed the risk to persist, not merely the actions of those operating when the final barriers failed.

The Larger Lesson

The Potomac collision should therefore be seen as a classic example of the difference between having safety-management processes and operating an effective SMS.

a) Reports existed.

b) Close calls occurred.

c) Data were available.

d) Concerns had been raised.

e) Yet the risk remained substantially unmitigated.

A near miss is not evidence that the system worked. It is evidence that some barriers failed, while others narrowly prevented an accident. Repeated near misses are even more serious. They indicate that the system may be repeatedly approaching its safety boundary.

The tragedy at DCA was therefore not simply the result of one night's errors. It was the culmination of known hazards, recurring precursor events, fragmented safety information, weak inter-agency risk management, inadequate route design, excessive reliance on visual separation, and delayed corrective action.

The central safety lesson is hard to ignore:

When multiple agencies possess warning signs of a foreseeable hazard but fail to integrate and act on them, the failure is systemic long before the accident occurs.

Author: GR Mohan

AI2379 AND AI171: INVESTIGATIVE INDEPENDENCE CANNOT BECOME INSTITUTIONAL SILENCE

 A preliminary accident report is not expected to determine causation, provide an exhaustive analysis, or pronounce definitive conclusions. But that limitation cannot serve as a convenient justification for withholding pertinent facts already established. Investigative independence and transparency are not competing principles. A credible investigation requires both.

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) therefore needs to confront a fundamental question: why does important factual information repeatedly surface in the public domain through unnamed “civil aviation sources”, leaked documents and media reports before the investigating authority acknowledges it?

For a major aviation occurrence, periodic factual briefings should be integral to the investigative process. They need not speculate on causation. They need only inform the public of what has been established, what remains under examination, what evidence is being analysed, and whether any immediate safety concern has been identified.

Silence does not suppress speculation. It creates the conditions for speculation to flourish.

AI2379: A Narrative That Changed Outside AAIB

The handling of AI2379 illustrates the problem.

The initial public narrative was turbulence. As late as 6 August, Civil Aviation Minister K. Rammohan Naidu was still discussing the occurrence principally in those terms. No official public reference mentioned the extraordinary transient loss of hydraulic pressure later identified in all three hydraulic systems.

Yet a substantially different story was already emerging elsewhere.

The Aviation Herald published a more technically detailed account on 5 August. Media organisations subsequently reported hydraulic-system problems, in some cases attributing their information to civil-aviation or investigative sources. By 10 August, reports were openly referring to a transient triple-hydraulic-system failure. A copy of the aircraft's post-flight technical report, apparently downloaded on 4 August and showing the relevant failure messages, surfaced publicly on 13 August.

Eventually, Airbus DFDR analysis and the AAIB preliminary report established the essential fact: the aircraft had experienced an extraordinary, rapid sequence of events involving loss of hydraulic pressure across all three systems, accompanied by significant degradation of flight-control capability.

The early reporting was therefore not simply wild media speculation. Its central technical assertion was subsequently substantially validated.

That raises an uncomfortable question. If such information was sufficiently credible to circulate among aviation sources and journalists, why was the investigating authority not the authoritative source explaining what was known and, equally importantly, what was not known?

The Captain's Condition: An Unanswered Human-Factors Question

Another issue requires clarification.

Media reports citing unnamed sources claimed that one pilot fell in the cockpit and required assistance from the cabin crew. Subsequent accounts went further, alleging that the PIC appeared unsteady after landing, required assistance to sit, and was physically supported while providing the post-flight urine sample (India Today). These reports remain unverified allegations unless the AAIB confirms them. They should not be presented as established fact.

But they cannot simply be ignored.

The relevant investigative question is clear:

What was the PIC’s physical and functional condition immediately before, during and after the occurrence, and why was he reportedly assisted?

The preliminary report states that, after recovering from the upset, the captain assumed control of the aircraft. If reports that he had fallen, was unsteady, or required assistance are accurate, an obvious operational question follows: why was control transferred to him?

Conversely, if the captain was fully fit and functioning normally, the AAIB could dismiss this speculation with a factual statement.

Both versions cannot comfortably coexist without an explanation.

Why Continue for Another 98 Minutes?

The operational decision following the hydraulic event raises an even more pressing question.

The aircraft had just experienced an apparently unprecedented transient loss of hydraulic pressure affecting all three systems, together with temporary degradation of key flight-control functions. The systems recovered, but the initiating mechanism remained unknown.

The crew nevertheless continued to their destination for about another 98 minutes rather than diverting to the nearest suitable airport.

That decision warrants rigorous examination.

What ECAM warnings and system indications were available to the crew? What did they understand about the sequence of hydraulic losses and subsequent recovery? Were the systems indicating normal operation afterwards? Did the crew appreciate that three hydraulic systems had apparently been affected within seconds of one another? What technical, operational or dispatch considerations supported continuation?

The issue is not whether hindsight can produce a better decision. The issue is whether continuation was consistent with the information actually available to the crew at the time.

That is precisely the sort of factual context an investigating authority can explain without determining whether probable cause exists.

An Aircraft-Specific Failure—or a Fleet Safety Issue?

The technical implications are equally significant.

VT-EXO's maintenance history is available to investigators. Airbus participated in the technical examination. DFDR data were recovered. Components and hydraulic fluid samples were reportedly subjected to further examination.

Yet the central technical question remains publicly unresolved:

Was this an aircraft-specific anomaly, or was there any possibility of a failure mechanism relevant to the wider A320neo fleet?

The distinction is critical.

The fleet was not grounded. No fleet-wide Airworthiness Directive was issued. No publicly known urgent service bulletin was issued. No comparable warning to operators emerged. This may ultimately indicate that investigators and Airbus found no evidence requiring immediate fleet action.

But the absence of regulatory action is not, by itself, an explanation.

If the analysis demonstrated that continued operation of the fleet posed no immediate safety concern, stating this would strengthen public confidence rather than compromise the investigation.

More troublingly, technical material reportedly linked to Airbus's early analysis was published publicly and later withdrawn on confidentiality grounds. Whether that material was authentic, preliminary or incomplete is precisely why authoritative communication matters. When official information is absent, leaked technical material inevitably acquires an authority it may not deserve.

What Is Known—and What Is Not

AI2379 is not an investigation starved of evidence.

The DFDR and CVR were available. The flight and cabin crew could be interviewed. Maintenance records were available. The post-flight technical report was available. Airbus and BEA participated in the technical investigation. The sequence of aircraft behaviour could therefore be reconstructed with considerable precision.

The immediate aircraft response—the altitude excursion, flight-control degradation, hydraulic-pressure losses and subsequent recovery—is well known.

What remains publicly unresolved is the most important technical question: what initiated the extraordinary hydraulic event?

That uncertainty is entirely legitimate. Complex technical investigations take time.

What is harder to defend is withholding established factual information merely because the ultimate causal mechanism is unknown.

AI171 Shows the Same Institutional Problem

The concern is not limited to AI2379.

The Supreme Court proceedings on AI171 revealed a similar communication deficit. Despite notices issued in September 2025, the Court was informed in January 2026 that the Centre and AAIB had still not filed their responses, and the investigating side was reportedly unrepresented when the matter was taken up. At a further hearing scheduled for May, counsel for AAIB was reportedly absent.

AAIB subsequently filed its substantive response opposing a court-monitored investigation and appeared before the Court to defend its investigative process.

Whatever the petition's legal merits, the optics are damaging.

An accident-investigation authority handling one of India's most consequential aviation disasters should not have to be repeatedly pressed—by courts, families, professional organisations or the media—to explain its procedures.

Transparency Is Not Premature Causation

There is a tendency to frame demands for information as demands for premature conclusions, but that is a false choice.

Nobody should expect AAIB to announce a probable cause before the evidence supports it. Nobody should expect protected CVR material, sensitive personal information or speculative technical hypotheses to be released merely to satisfy public curiosity.

But verified factual information is different from investigative speculation.

AAIB can say what the recorders show without explaining why it happened. It can describe components under examination without predicting what those examinations will establish. It can state whether an immediate fleet-safety concern has been identified without prejudging final causation. It can clarify demonstrably false narratives without compromising investigative independence.

That is what mature accident-investigation authorities do.

The present approach risks producing precisely the opposite outcome. Official silence leaves journalists reliant on anonymous sources. Technical documents leak. Partial information is amplified. Competing narratives become entrenched. Investigators then cite confidentiality to avoid discussing information already in the public domain.

Confidentiality cannot replace communication.

AAIB's responsibility is not merely to produce a technically defensible final report months or years after an occurrence. It must also preserve confidence in the investigative process during the investigation.

AI2379 demonstrates why this matters. The public was initially told about turbulence. Hydraulic-system information emerged elsewhere. Technical documents surfaced, and Airbus analysis was reported. Questions arose about the captain's physical condition. The decision to continue for another 98 minutes remained unexplained. Eventually, the preliminary report confirmed much of the underlying technical sequence.

The problem is therefore no longer simply a matter of insufficient information.

It is a problem of who provides that information, when it is provided, and whether the investigating authority remains the most credible source of facts about its own investigation.

On that measure, AAIB has serious grounds for recovery.

Investigative independence deserves protection, but institutional silence does not.

Note: The Final report on AI171 is expected on 13 Oct 2026. Hope it puts some of the ongoing speculations to rest.

Author: GR Mohan

AI2379: Transparency Must Not Be Lost in the Investigation

 The preliminary report on Air India flight AI2379 raises more questions than it answers. That is not, by itself, a criticism of an accident investigation. Preliminary reports are not intended to establish causation or apportion blame. But when an aircraft loses all three hydraulic systems in rapid succession, loses autopilot and flight-control capability, triggers a stall warning, and undergoes a significant altitude excursion, the aviation community is entitled to expect a clear account of the established facts and any immediate safety implications.

AI2379, an Airbus A320-251N, was operating from Phuket to Delhi on 4 August 2026 with 145 people on board. The aircraft was cruising at FL360 when, according to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), the flight-control system detected a loss of Green hydraulic pressure at 04:02:43 UTC. Four seconds later, Blue and Yellow hydraulic pressures were also reported as lost. At 04:02:48, the autopilot disconnected, and a continuous, repetitive chime sounded. Three seconds later, a stall warning was triggered.

The aircraft initially climbed 372 feet above its assigned level, then descended 292 feet. The First Officer, who was Pilot Flying, attempted to control the aircraft before the Pilot-in-Command took over. (Unofficial reports indicate that the pilot was standing behind the copilot, fell during the incident, and was helped into the seat by the cabin crew. After landing, the crew assisted him off the aircraft because he could not move on his own.) Remarkably, the Blue hydraulic system recovered almost immediately, followed within seconds by Yellow and Green, with the flight-control surfaces recovering and normal aircraft operation restored. The central technical question is therefore clear: why did three normally independent hydraulic systems apparently lose pressure almost simultaneously, and why did they recover within seconds?

The preliminary report does not answer that question. Nor should it be expected to at this stage. What is harder to understand is why the report offers so little indication of what the investigation team has established about this extraordinary sequence, despite already having access to the principal sources of evidence.

The AAIB states that it recovered, downloaded, and made both the CVR and DFDR available to the investigation team. The AAIB also conducted in-person interviews with the pilots and cabin crew. It further notes that Airbus technical experts, assigned through France’s BEA, inspected the aircraft between 13 and 15 August. Investigators then removed hydraulic components and collected fluid samples for further analysis, and collected maintenance and operational records, fuel and oil samples, and ATC data.

In other words, this is not an investigation awaiting evidence. Considerable evidence was already in hand, making the lack of a meaningful technical safety assessment particularly striking. Classifying it as an accident should not be a reason to withhold established safety-relevant facts. A legitimate distinction exists between releasing factual information and prematurely declaring a probable cause. The former can support safety; the latter can prejudice an investigation.

AAIB need not—and should not—speculate publicly about the root cause while evidence is still being analysed. But it could have stated clearly what is already known. That would neither compromise the investigation nor assign blame.

Another issue that cannot be overlooked concerns what happened after the hydraulic systems recovered.

The report records that the cabin supervisor informed the cockpit of the injuries. The aircraft experienced a triple hydraulic failure, a temporary loss and recovery of flight controls, and an altitude upset. Yet the crew elected to continue to Delhi for approximately 1 hour 28 minutes rather than divert. The preliminary report records that decision but does not analyse it. This decision warrants careful professional scrutiny.

The investigation must establish precisely what the crew saw on the ECAM, which hydraulic indications remained after recovery, and what the CVR and crew interviews reveal about the crew’s assessment and decision-making.

There have also been reports of speculation about “human intervention”. The published chronology, by itself, does not establish that humans deliberately initiated the hydraulic failures. Any conclusion about crew input must be based on the correlation of control inputs, system parameters, ECAM events, warnings, and CVR evidence—not on selective leaks or anonymous briefings.

The preliminary report does not establish that the toxicology result caused, contributed to, or was related to the hydraulic failure or altitude excursion. The technical sequence remains unexplained.

What Airbus knows matters

Perhaps the most uncomfortable aspect is the apparent discrepancy between what has emerged publicly from technical sources and what has appeared in the official preliminary report. The AAIB has already confirmed Airbus's technical involvement. Yet the preliminary report makes no technical safety recommendations to Airbus or the operator regarding the apparent simultaneous loss of all three hydraulic systems.

That is not necessarily evidence of an investigative failure. A safety recommendation should be based on a sufficiently validated safety issue. If the investigation has not yet established the mechanism, an immediate fleet-wide technical recommendation may not be justified.

But this raises an important question: has the investigation established that the event was confined to VT-EXO, or has it carried out an interim fleet-risk assessment?

If the answer is yes, the aviation community should be told why no precautionary action is considered necessary. If the answer is no, that too warrants explanation.

Ultimately, a safety investigation is about learning from the last event before the next—not merely explaining it.

Transparency is itself a safety tool

At present, there is insufficient evidence to accuse AAIB of a deliberate cover-up. Such an allegation would be premature and unfair. However, the current communication strategy creates an avoidable perception of selective disclosure.

When official silence is accompanied by fragmented technical information emerging through other channels, speculation inevitably fills the vacuum. That is particularly dangerous when the event involves a modern transport aircraft apparently losing all three hydraulic systems simultaneously. AAIB’s own report states that its sole objective is to prevent future accidents and incidents, not to apportion blame or liability. That principle should extend to its communication with the aviation community. Its only substantive public statement says it is collecting evidence and that no conclusions should be drawn from isolated information. Meanwhile, detailed engineering information has emerged through the media. The consequence is perverse: the official investigator supplies less factual information than leaked Airbus and maintenance documents, leaving unofficial sources to define the public narrative.

And that creates exactly the problem we discussed previously with AI 171: confidentiality is being interpreted as silence rather than as disciplined transparency.

AI2379 presents an extraordinary technical event, a significant crew decision, and a potentially important systemic safety issue. The final cause may take months to determine. Selective leaks to the media have clouded the investigation and shaped the public narrative. There is no justification for allowing uncertainty about the cause to become uncertainty about the facts.

The aviation community does not need premature conclusions.

It needs the truth about what is already known.

Author: GR Mohan

Accident Investigation in India: Silence Is Not Transparency

 Aircraft accident investigations take time, which is understandable.

What is harder to justify is prolonged silence when verified facts are already available.

The recent handling of Vietnam Airlines flight VN34 in Munich, the mid-air collision over the Potomac in the United States involving Air India flight AI2379, and the ongoing investigation into AI171 raise an important question for India: should an investigating authority remain largely silent until it is ready to discuss probable cause, or should it progressively share established facts as the investigation progresses?

These are not the same.

Investigators should not speculate. They should not announce causes before the evidence supports them. But investigative caution does not require an information vacuum.

Following the VN34 incident at Munich on 15 August 2026, Vietnamese aviation authorities released a factual account within about a day. It detailed the sequence of events, the warnings received, the crew’s decision to return, and how passengers were handled afterwards.

It did not attempt to explain why the incident happened. That is the key distinction.

A wide gap exists between saying nothing and declaring a cause. Within that gap lie verified facts: recorded warnings, aircraft behaviour, systems under examination, recorder recovery, completed tests, and safety actions already taken.

Sharing such information does not compromise an investigation. It helps establish the investigating authority as the most credible source of information. The January 2025 Potomac mid-air collision provides an even clearer example. The US National Transportation Safety Board held repeated briefings, progressively released factual information, and later held public hearings while its investigation continued. The final determination still took about a year.

The NTSB did not confuse transparency with premature judgement.

Instead, it allowed the public and the professional community to see that the investigation was progressing.

That visibility matters.

In contrast, India's handling of AI2379 left a significant information gap. AAIB confirmed it had opened an investigation and said it would release further information at an appropriate stage. Yet other sources later released important technical details on hydraulic-system behaviour and flight-control response. The Airbus technical analysis of the DFDR data, which was initially available, was later withdrawn from public view.

That is not an ideal situation.

If reliable technical information is already available to investigators, the official investigating authority should ideally be the first to inform the public of what has been established and what remains uncertain.

A statement that a system lost pressure, that specific warnings were recorded, or that flight controls became temporarily unavailable is not a causal conclusion. It is factual information. Determining why it happened is a separate analytical task.

The distinction between facts and causation should be fundamental to investigative communication.

AI171 raises the issue at an entirely different level.

The accident occurred on 12 June 2025. AAIB released a preliminary report one month later. A year after the accident, it stated that it had carried out an extensive examination of technical, operational, organisational and human factors.

That is reassuring as far as it goes.

But it also invites a reasonable question: what has that extensive examination established that it can now responsibly share?

The criticism is not that AAIB has failed to announce a cause. A catastrophic accident involving a modern wide-body aircraft may legitimately require a lengthy and complex investigation.

The more pressing concern is why so little additional factual information from the investigating authority has entered the public domain.

a) What systems have been examined?

b) Which component tests have been completed?

c) Have any hypotheses been eliminated?

d) Have any interim safety concerns emerged?

e) What major areas remain unresolved?

None of these questions requires the disclosure of protected cockpit voice recordings, confidential witness testimony, or evidence whose release could prejudice the investigation.

They simply ask where the investigation is.

An information vacuum does not stop speculation. It encourages it.

When the investigating authority offers limited information, others tend to fill the void with anonymous sources, leaks, media commentary, social media analysis, and complex technical theories. This pattern can have unintended consequences, undermining the purpose of investigative restraint. Rather than reducing confusion, institutional silence may actually allow it to grow.

Some may be informed, but many may not be.

The unfortunate result is that silence intended to prevent confusion can cause more confusion.

There is also a longer-term concern.

Public attention peaks immediately after an accident or serious incident and naturally declines over time. No evidence shows that AAIB deliberately delays to let public interest fade, and such a motive should not be alleged without proof.

However, prolonged non-communication can still produce that effect.

By the time substantive findings finally emerge, public scrutiny may have substantially diminished.

That is why periodic factual disclosure should not be regarded as a public-relations exercise. It should be recognised as part of modern safety-investigation practice.

ICAO Annex 13 properly protects certain investigative records and sensitive evidence. But confidentiality of protected material should not become opacity about the investigation's progress.

A professional investigation authority should be able to say:

a) These are the facts currently established.

b) These matters are still under examination.

c) These issues remain unresolved.

d) No conclusion on probable cause has yet been reached.

That is not premature disclosure. It is disciplined transparency.

The communication issue also raises a further concern: independence.

AAIB was established to separate accident investigation from DGCA’s regulatory function. That was both necessary and sensible. However, AAIB still operates administratively within the Ministry of Civil Aviation.

There is no evidence that MoCA or DGCA has improperly interfered with the AI171 or AI2379 investigations, and it would be irresponsible to suggest otherwise without proof.

But institutional independence is not only about whether interference has occurred. It is also about whether the structure is sufficiently independent to remove any reasonable perception of it.

An accident investigation may ultimately need to examine regulatory oversight, certification, air traffic management, airport operations, or government aviation policy. The investigating authority must therefore be positioned to scrutinise the entire aviation system, including regulators and government agencies, without ambiguity.

Independence must be both genuine and visible.

India does not need AAIB to become a running commentary service. Nor should investigators respond to every speculative theory in the media.

What is needed is simpler: a deliberate policy of periodic factual communication.

For major accidents and serious incidents, AAIB could issue concise updates at key milestones, covering recorder analysis, systems under examination, major tests completed, and any immediate safety action. Each update could make clear that the information is factual and provisional, and that no causal conclusion should be inferred.

VN34 and Potomac show that transparency and investigative rigour are not opposites.

AI2379 and AI171 suggest that India has yet to maintain that balance consistently.

The real question is not whether AAIB should pronounce causes earlier.

It is whether India’s accident-investigation system should communicate more openly while it works.

Investigations require patience.

Public confidence requires visibility.

The two are not incompatible.

 

Author: GR Mohan