Over the past two decades, India has witnessed several serious aviation accidents. Yet, in many cases, the findings of these investigations have either not been published in a timely manner or have been released with limited substantive detail. This persistent opacity raises a fundamental question: is the absence of accessible investigative outcomes a result of deliberate institutional reticence, or does it reflect systemic apathy within the regulatory framework?
The most recent and widely publicised example is the Air India Boeing 787 Dreamliner accident during take-off at Ahmedabad. Despite the passage of several months since the occurrence, there has been little meaningful clarity regarding causal factors. The Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB), which has been tasked with the investigation, is structured primarily as a technical body. While technical competence is indispensable, effective accident investigation—particularly for complex airline operations—demands deep expertise in operational decision-making, human factors, organisational culture, and systemic risk management. In these domains, the AAIB’s capabilities appear limited.
A preliminary report was released in compliance with ICAO Annex 13 requirements. However, the document contained minimal analytical depth and offered little insight into the sequence of events or contributory factors. Rather than providing clarity, the report generated further uncertainty, prompting multiple stakeholders to seek judicial intervention to compel clarification of its contents. These proceedings have been repeatedly adjourned, largely due to the Civil Aviation Ministry’s failure to submit information requested by the court, reinforcing perceptions of deliberate non-cooperation.
ICAO-Mandated Timelines and International Practice
Internationally, aviation accident investigation follows clearly defined timelines intended to balance timeliness with analytical rigour:
a) Initial Notification: Operators must notify the relevant authorities (DGCA and AAIB in India) within 24 hours of an accident or serious incident.
b) Preliminary Report: As per ICAO Annex 13, the State of Occurrence must submit a preliminary report to ICAO within 30 days.
c) Final Report (Target): ICAO guidance recommends publication of the final report within 12 months.
d) Interim Statement: If the final report is not ready within 12 months, an interim statement outlining progress must be issued on the anniversary of the accident.
e) Complex Investigations: In particularly complex cases—such as those involving extensive wreckage damage or intricate system interactions—investigations may extend to 18–24 months. Agencies such as the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) routinely provide periodic updates during this period.
These timelines are designed not merely for procedural compliance but to ensure that safety lessons are identified and disseminated without undue delay.
Disclosure Restrictions and Misinterpretation
Indian regulations and international standards both restrict the public disclosure of certain sensitive materials. Rule 17(5) of the Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules, 2025 explicitly prohibits the release of cockpit voice recordings and airborne image recordings. This mirrors ICAO Annex 13, Appendix 2, which requires States to ensure non-disclosure of such material to protect the integrity of investigations and the privacy of flight crews.
However, the legitimate need for confidentiality should not be conflated with an absence of analytical transparency. While raw audio or video data must remain protected, investigative authorities are still expected to clearly articulate factual findings, validated hypotheses, and emerging safety concerns.
Vacuum of Information and the Rise of Speculation
The lack of substantive detail in the preliminary report created an information vacuum that was rapidly filled by speculation. A proliferation of self-styled aviation experts advanced unverified theories, often through monetised podcasts and websites, prioritising sensationalism over evidence-based analysis. Rather than being countered by authoritative updates, these narratives were allowed to flourish, as the AAIB maintained a prolonged and conspicuous silence.
Simultaneously, professional pilot associations appeared primarily focused on pre-emptively deflecting any attribution of blame to the flight crew. This defensive posture escalated into opposition to investigative steps such as calling witnesses who might provide insight into crew decision-making, psychological stressors, or organisational pressures. Such resistance runs counter to modern safety science, which emphasises understanding—not assigning blame for—human performance within complex systems.
Absence of International Signals
Equally noteworthy is the absence of any public concern or technical advisories from international stakeholders involved in the investigation, including the FAA, the aircraft manufacturer (OEM), and the NTSB. Given the global fleet size of the Boeing 787, even preliminary indications of a systemic technical issue would normally trigger wider scrutiny, operational advisories, or interim safety recommendations. No such signals have emerged, and the aircraft continues to operate worldwide without design-related restrictions—suggesting that, at least thus far, no compelling evidence of a fundamental technical flaw has been identified.
Contrast with International Investigative Transparency
A comparison with international investigative practice is instructive. In the recent mid-air collision over the Potomac River involving a U.S. military helicopter and a commercial airliner, the NTSB issued multiple press briefings and investigative updates. These communications went beyond identifying proximate causes and examined deeper systemic failures, including airspace design, inter-agency coordination, and procedural oversight.
Similarly, following the UPS MD-11 crash during take-off, the NTSB released detailed interim findings that progressively built a comprehensive understanding of both technical and organisational contributors. Such openness has been conspicuously absent in comparable Indian investigations.
Systemic Issues and Normalisation of Deviance
On 12 January 2026, a U.S.-based aviation safety foundation presented findings to the U.S. Senate based on whistleblower disclosures, highlighting how systemic faults are often mischaracterised as isolated anomalies—an archetypal case of the “normalisation of deviance.” In parallel, Safety Matters Foundation (India) has raised concerns regarding potential latent failures in aircraft electrical systems and Flight Control Modules (FCMs). To date, the AAIB has not publicly responded to these allegations. The matter is now expected to be addressed before the Supreme Court on 28 January 2026.
A Persistent and Concerning Pattern
Unfortunately, a troubling pattern appears to have emerged within India’s aviation safety ecosystem. Accident reports frequently underplay or obscure root causes, focusing instead on superficial corrective actions that do little to address underlying systemic deficiencies. Preventive measures are often framed in generic terms, while the public remains largely uninformed about structural weaknesses in regulatory oversight, safety assurance, and organisational accountability.
The overarching priority of investigative and regulatory agencies seems less oriented toward transparent safety learning and more toward deflecting responsibility until public attention dissipates. Such an approach not only undermines confidence in the investigative process but also compromises the very purpose of accident investigation: the prevention of future occurrences.
Author: GR Mohan
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