Causes, Training Implications and Remedial Measures
The recent increase in reported tail strikes during landing and very-low-level go-arounds has raised concerns about flight crew competence and training standards. Several incidents involve several major aircraft types, including the Airbus A321neo, A300-600, A350-900, A350-1000 and Boeing 777-300ER.
These occurrences do not establish that airline pilots are generally incompetent. They do, however, reveal recurring weaknesses in energy management, pitch control, bounce recovery, go-around decision-making and crew coordination in the final seconds before landing.
The typical sequence is:
unstable or disturbed approach → delayed decision → abnormal flare or touchdown → bounce or low-level go-around → excessive or mistimed pitch input → tail strike.
The immediate cause is usually excessive pitch attitude or pitch rate. The deeper causes often include continuation of an unstable approach, poor recovery from a bounce, startle, insufficient awareness of long-body aircraft geometry, and inadequate monitoring and training that does not realistically replicate go-arounds initiated during the flare or after touchdown.
The most effective remedies are stricter stabilised-approach discipline, realistic simulator training, better bounce-recovery instruction, improved monitoring, stronger training on long-body differences, and proactive use of flight-data monitoring.
1. Recent occurrence pattern
An IndiGo A321neo reportedly suffered a tail strike during a low-altitude go-around at Mumbai in heavy rain. The aircraft climbed away and subsequently landed safely. The event combined degraded visual references, a late transition from landing to go-around, and the limited tail clearance margin of a long-bodied aircraft.
A Wizz Air UK A321neo experienced a tail strike on landing at Prague. Although detailed findings were not immediately available, the incident again involved the long A321 variant.
An EAT Leipzig A300-600 reportedly sustained a tail strike during a landing and a baulked-landing sequence at London Heathrow. Such events are particularly demanding because the crew may select go-around thrust while the aircraft is still touching, bouncing, or settling towards the runway.
A Cathay Pacific A350-1000 contacted the runway during a go-around initiated in the flare at Hong Kong. The aircraft sustained damage to its lower aft fuselage. The commander was highly experienced, demonstrating that total flying hours alone do not eliminate vulnerability to a sudden, high-workload event close to the ground.
A Singapore Airlines A350-900 was also reported to have sustained a tail strike during a go-around at Singapore.
An Air India A321neo reportedly sustained a tail strike during a go-around at Bengaluru. Wake turbulence was cited as a possible cause, although final conclusions require analysis of recorded data.
A Kalitta Air Boeing 777-300ER freighter scraped its tail during a go-around at Cincinnati. Video showed a trail of sparks before the aircraft climbed away and later landed safely.
These events share three common characteristics:
a) they occurred mainly during landing or during very-low-level go-arounds;
b) several involved long-bodied aircraft;
c) they affected different airlines, aircraft types and levels of crew experience.
2. Is poor pilot competence the main cause?
Pilot handling is directly involved in most tail strikes because contact generally requires an excessive pitch attitude, an excessive rotation rate, or an inappropriate control response. However, attributing every occurrence solely to poor flying competence is inadequate.
Competence in this area includes:
a) maintaining the correct energy state;
b) recognising an unstable approach;
c) making a timely go-around decision;
d) controlling pitch precisely;
e) recovering correctly from a bounce;
f) executing a go-around after touchdown;
g) monitoring the other pilot;
h) transferring control clearly;
i) responding appropriately under surprise and time pressure.
A pilot may be licensed, experienced and recurrently checked, yet have limited exposure to sudden sink, bounce or go-around initiated during the flare. The concern is therefore not necessarily a general decline in licensing standards. It is more likely a mismatch between conventional training and the scenarios encountered in line operations.
Many recurrent simulator programmes practise go-arounds from stable approaches at predictable altitudes. Far fewer realistically reproduce:
a) an unexpected bounce;
b) a go-around after main-gear contact;
c) delayed engine response;
d) wake-induced sink below 50 feet;
e) degraded visual references;
f) simultaneous control inputs;
g) reduced pitch margin on long-bodied variants.
The problem is therefore better described as a deficiency in scenario-based preparation, judgement and dynamic handling, rather than a simple lack of basic flying skills.
3. Principal causal factors
3.1 Excessive or mistimed pitch
The immediate cause of most tail strikes is an excessive nose-up attitude or a rapid increase in pitch while the aircraft is still on, or very close to, the runway.
During a low-level go-around, engine thrust does not immediately produce climb. Engine acceleration, aircraft inertia and lift development require time. If the pilot attempts to gain immediate ground clearance mainly by pulling back, the tail may contact the runway before climb performance develops.
The governing principle is:
Thrust creates the climb; pitch must remain within the available aerodynamic and geometric margins.
3.2 Unstable approach and poor energy management
Many tail strikes begin well before touchdown.
Typical precursors include:
a) excessive approach speed;
b) high sink rate below 100 feet;
c) late configuration;
d) inappropriate thrust;
e) repeated vertical corrections;
f) an approach requiring an aggressive flare.
An aircraft may be aligned with the runway and close to the glidepath yet still be unstable in energy. If it crosses the threshold too fast or with excessive sink, the pilot may attempt to salvage the landing with a large flare.
This may result in a firm touchdown, a bounce, a prolonged float, or direct tail contact.
Stabilised-approach monitoring must therefore continue right up to touchdown. An approach that was stable at 500 or 1,000 feet can deteriorate rapidly below 100 feet.
3.3 Delayed go-around
A go-around initiated well above the runway is relatively straightforward. A go-around initiated during the flare or after touchdown is far more demanding.
Late decisions may result from:
continuation bias;
a) belief that the approach can still be recovered;
b) reluctance to accept delay or additional fuel burn;
c) weak intervention by the monitoring pilot;
d) operational pressure to complete the landing;
e) an organisational culture that informally discourages go-arounds.
Some late go-arounds are unavoidable due to sudden wind changes, runway incursions, wake encounters, or loss of visual reference. However, when the approach was already deteriorating, a flare-level go-around often marks the final stage in a chain of missed opportunities.
3.4 Incorrect bounce recovery
A bounced landing is one of the most significant precursors to a tail strike.
The instinctive response may be to pull back to soften the next touchdown or to prevent the nose from dropping. This can increase the aircraft's pitch as it descends back towards the runway.
The risk is greatest when the aircraft is slow, thrust is near idle, and the bounce is pronounced.
Crews must distinguish between a minor bounce that may be recoverable under the manufacturer’s guidance and a significant or worsening bounce that requires a go-around.
Particularly hazardous actions include:
a) forcing the aircraft back onto the runway;
b) making large fore-and-aft control inputs;
c) attempting to soften the second touchdown with excessive pitch;
d) delaying the go-around after a severe bounce.
3.5 Long-body aircraft geometry
Several recent events involved long-fuselage aircraft.
A long fuselage does not make an aircraft unsafe, but it reduces the geometric margin between a normal operational pitch attitude and tail contact.
Tail clearance is influenced by:
1) landing-gear compression;
2) runway slope;
3) pitch rate;
4) aircraft mass;
5) centre of gravity;
6) vertical acceleration;
7) bounce dynamics.
Cockpit commonality can create a false sense of familiarity. A pilot moving from an A320 to an A321, from an A350-900 to an A350-1000, or from a shorter Boeing 777 variant to the 777-300ER may operate in a familiar cockpit, even though the tail-clearance margin has been materially reduced.
Differences training should therefore address handling and geometry, not merely aircraft systems.
3.6 Startle and overcontrol
A sudden sink, bounce, wake encounter, or runway conflict can trigger an instinctive urge to pull the aircraft away from the ground.
On a large transport aircraft, the tail responds immediately to a pitch input, whereas useful climb performance develops more slowly. An abrupt aft input may therefore reduce tail clearance before thrust becomes effective.
This may not reflect a lack of knowledge. It may indicate that the correct response has not been sufficiently practised in realistic conditions.
3.7 Weak monitoring and control transfer
The pilot monitoring should identify:
a) excessive sink rate;
b) abnormal pitch;
c) unstable flare;
d) significant bounce;
e) unsafe continuation;
f) incorrect go-around attitude.
Intervention should be progressive and unambiguous:
1) identify the deviation;
2) issue a corrective call;
3) command a go-around;
4) take control only when necessary.
An abrupt takeover near the runway may result in simultaneous or conflicting control inputs if the transfer is not verbally announced.
3.8 Environmental and operational factors
Heavy rain, gusts, crosswind, wind shear, turbulence and wake can cause sudden changes in flight path near touchdown.
These conditions are generally triggering factors rather than complete explanations. The outcome also depends on the crew’s recognition, pitch response, thrust application and decision timing.
Fatigue and operational pressure can further impair judgement, reaction time, monitoring and willingness to go around. These factors should be considered in every serious tail-strike investigation.
4. Root-cause framework
Tail strikes can be considered at four levels.
Immediate event
1) excessive pitch attitude;
2) excessive pitch rate;
3) abnormal rotation;
4) mishandled flare or bounce;
5) excessive pitch during go-around.
Operational precursor
a) unstable energy state;
b) high sink below 100 feet;
c) disturbed approach;
d) delayed go-around;
e) poor thrust-pitch coordination.
Crew-performance factor
a) startle;
b) weak monitoring;
c) poor control transfer;
d) inadequate understanding of aircraft geometry;
e) continuation bias.
Organisational factor
a) unrealistic recurrent training;
b) weak instructor standardisation;
c) limited differences training;
d) inadequate flight-data monitoring;
e) poor fatigue controls;
f) a culture that discourages go-arounds.
Corrective action must address all four levels. Retraining only the crew involved addresses the final symptom rather than the wider safety system.
5. Priority remedial measures
Enforce stabilised approaches to touchdown
Stabilisation criteria should remain below the conventional 500- or 1,000-foot gate.
A go-around should be mandatory for:
1) excessive sink rate;
2) speed outside limits;
3) repeated large corrections;
4) inappropriate thrust;
5) loss of required visual reference;
6) inability to achieve a normal flare.
Train low-level and post-touchdown go-arounds
Recurrent simulator programmes should include:
1) go-around during the flare;
2) go-around after main-gear contact;
3) go-around following a bounce;
4) delayed engine acceleration;
5) wake-induced sink;
6) degraded visibility;
7) long-body pitch-limit management.
Some scenarios should be introduced without warning to assess startle management and judgement.
Reinforce pitch discipline
Training should emphasise:
1) apply go-around thrust;
2) control the descent with measured pitch input;
3) respect prescribed pitch attitudes and pitch-limit indications;
4) allow thrust and speed to establish climb;
5) avoid seeking immediate separation through elevator alone.
Improve bounce-recovery training
Crews should receive clear guidance on minor and significant bounces.
Training should reinforce:
a) maintaining a stable attitude;
b) avoiding large control inputs;
c) not forcing the aircraft onto the runway;
d) going around when bounce severity is uncertain.
Strengthen pilot monitoring
Operators should standardise calls for:
a) deviation;
b) correction;
c) mandatory go-around;
d) control takeover.
The pilot monitoring must be empowered to call a go-around without hesitation.
Improve long-body differences training
Pilots transitioning to long variants should receive practical training in:
a) maximum-weight rotation;
b) high-sink landing;
c) bounced landing;
d) crosswind flare;
e) go-around during flare;
f) go-around after touchdown.
Computer-based familiarisation alone is insufficient.
Use flight-data monitoring proactively
Operators should track:
a) rotation rate;
b) pitch at lift-off;
c) sink 100 and 50 feet below;
d) touchdown vertical acceleration;
e) bounce signatures;
f) pitch after touchdown;
g) low-level go-arounds;
h) unstable approaches continued to land.
The purpose should be early risk detection rather than punishment.
Create a go-around-positive culture
Crews should not be criticised for prudent go-arounds prompted by fuel scrutiny, delay reviews, or informal pressure.
Safety performance should focus on unstable approaches continued to land, late go-arounds, and repeated high-sink or bounce events—not on the total number of go-arounds.
Conclusion
The recent pattern of tail strikes does not prove that commercial pilots are generally incompetent. It reveals a recurring weakness in the management of energy, pitch and decision-making during landing and very-low-level go-around manoeuvres.
The final mechanism is usually excessive or mistimed pitch. The underlying causes commonly include:
a) unstable or disturbed approaches;
b) delayed go-around decisions;
c) incorrect bounce recovery;
d) startle-induced overcontrol;
e) reduced pitch margin on long-bodied aircraft;
f) weak monitoring;
g) inadequate scenario-based training;
h) organisational pressure to continue.
The solution is not simply more frequent checks. It requires realistic simulator training, strict enforcement of the stabilised approach, improved bounce and low-level go-around instruction, stronger monitoring, improved differences training, and proactive use of flight data.
A tail strike may be caused by the final pitch input, but it is usually prevented by earlier decisions, monitoring and organisational safeguards.
Author: GR Mohan
