Indian aviation continues to face a credibility challenge stemming from operational shortfalls, perceptions of regulatory opacity, institutional fragility, and, in some quarters, allegations of corruption. My earlier evaluation of the AI 2379 incident rested almost exclusively on the technical data available at the time. I normally confine myself to conclusions grounded in recorded evidence. After further reflection, I am making a rare departure into reasoned speculation.
One possibility—if the unverified reports of the pilot’s earlier unconventional experimentation are accurate—is especially troubling. It has been claimed that he had previously switched off all fuel pumps to test whether gravity feed alone would keep the engines running. If a similar experimental inclination had been present on this flight, an alternative explanation for the reported hydraulic event would become conceivable.
The aircraft landed in Delhi at 11:03 IST. Maintenance personnel downloaded the post-flight report at 11:14 IST, which recorded multiple hydraulic-system failures and alerts. Airbus provided its DFDR analysis response at 02:59 on 5 August. Despite that information, the first public statements attributed the altitude excursion to turbulence. The pilot’s formal report and the corresponding tech-log entry have not been released. After media reports citing DGCA sources mentioned a possible hydraulic malfunction, the airline characterised the event as a transient triple hydraulic failure. The pattern of limited disclosure has again fuelled questions about transparency.
Reports indicate the captain was standing behind the first officer at the critical moment. In that position, it is at least physically possible that the hydraulic control switches could have been manipulated, simultaneously deactivating the Green, Blue and Yellow systems. Loss of hydraulic pressure would have left the elevators and ailerons without powered control for approximately four seconds. In damping mode, the ailerons would have drifted towards their zero-hinge-moment positions (reportedly around –13°), producing a pitch excursion.
Faced with the sudden pitch increase and loss of control, the first officer might have pushed the sidestick nose-down, which initially had little effect. Once hydraulic pressure was regained, this input would have taken effect quickly, causing a rapid descent and a negative-G experience. Reports state that, in the process, the captain fell onto the cockpit floor and the cabin crew assisted him back to his seat.
Such a sequence would also account for an otherwise puzzling feature of the event: after the disturbance, the aircraft recovered, remained controllable, and continued to its destination, landing some 90 minutes later. A reversible cockpit action could more readily explain a brief, self-limiting loss of control than a genuine, simultaneous failure of three independent hydraulic systems—an event long regarded as extremely improbable on the A320.
This remains speculation. The official investigation by the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau, assisted by the French BEA and Airbus, is still examining the DFDR, CVR, maintenance records and human-factor evidence. Until the primary data and a completed causal analysis are published, any hypothesis attributing the event to deliberate interference must be treated with appropriate caution.
Author: GR Mohan
No comments:
Post a Comment